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Abstract: We undertake a rst step to investigating a reform that has been
applied in numerous universities across Europe: the right to select students. We
ask to what extent this right will increase the eciency of the university. While
it seems evident that giving universities the right to select students that match
best with the human capital of professors should increase eciency measures
in the productivities of students in the labor market, we point to a potentially
negative eect. We argue that allowing universities to select the students they
prefer can reduce the incentives of the universities to improve the human capital
of their professors.
1 Introduction
Following Humboldt's ideals, European post-war universities have for long en-
joyed substantial academic freedom in their teaching and research. Funding was
largely in xed terms, and independent of performance. Throughout the last
decade, European universities have been involved in a reform process the goal
of which has been expressed in the Lisbon agenda: \To make Europe, by 2010,
the most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the
world".
Many measures have been taken by the EU and dierent members states
with this goal in mind. Among the instruments experimented with are more
competitive research funding (through the European Research Council and the
National Science Foundations such as the ANR in France or the DFG in Ger-
many), excellence initiatives as triggered by the Schr oder Government in 2005
and recently emulated by the \grand emprunt" in France, and the introduction
of student fees in some German states and in the UK. The general view is that
the governance and nancing structure of universities needs to be changed in
order to increase the competitiveness of the university system.
The ndings, recommendations, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper
are those of the authors and not necessarily re
ect the view of the Department of Economics
of the Universidad del Rosario.
1These changes are most notable in the elds of engineering, business and
economics, where the success of a university is now increasingly measured by the
job market success of the graduates, i.e. by their employment rates and wages.
This posits a challenge for many universities that are expected to update their
human capital in research and teaching to be able to educate students in a way
that they t the needs of employers. The skills of professors and the university
administration naturally does not simply grow and change with the needs of
the society, but substantial eorts must be undertaken to be able to provide the
teaching that is required in order to produce good graduates.
Consider for instance, the business department of a university in which IT
professors have a strong operations research background that they acquired at
the time of their graduate education, say in the 80s. The market now demands
them to educate students in e-commerce, network economics, in the development
of open-source software or e-marketing. This necessarily means that eort must
be spent on retraining the faculty, re-directing the research eorts, and, in
particular, hiring young people with the right skills. Hiring is a joint eort
between faculty and administration, and the administration needs to invest in
student services and marketing. Thus staying on top of the requirements implies
university-wide investments of time and money.
Besides the array of instruments that have been introduced to steer uni-
versities towards providing education and research in line with the needs of
the economy, there is also a general tendency to provide universities with more
autonomy. In many European economies there are still limits on universities'
autonomy in terms of levying tuition fees, but universities frequently have been
granted the autonomy to select their own students.
There are hence two general tendencies: a need to undertake eorts in order
to update the human capital of universities, and increasing autonomy to select
students. We here suggest a simple micro-economic analysis of the interaction
of these two tendencies. More precisely we ask to what extent it is good to give
universities that need to update their human capital the autonomy to select their
students. One could expect that this autonomy is always welfare-enhancing.
However, we show that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, we show that
there is a complementarity between the two instruments: In the absence of
nancing constraints for students, giving universities the right to levy tuition
fees and select students provides a rst-best level of welfare.
However, when tuition fees are unavailable, for instance, because society does
not want to exclude liquidity-constrained students, then a trade-o emerges.
When universities are allowed to select students, this makes it possible for uni-
versities to avoid the private costs of having to educate students they do not
like. Thus the places in top universities are taken by top students only, and the
ones in less good universities by less good students. The right of selection thus
leads to a segmented university system in which professors educate the people
they like. This comes at two costs. First, some of the most talented potential
students are excluded from the university system all together. Second, univer-
sities have no motivation to invest eort in order to adjust to accommodate
the most talented students. The welfare comparisons are intricate but we can
2show that when the proprotion of talent in society is high, giving universities
the right to select without the right to levy tuition fees is more likely to be
welfare-decreasing.
Our theory identies a trade-o that is only present when the reform is
piecemeal, i.e., when selection by universities is allowed, but no tuition. If,
however, tuitions are possible as well, selection of students by universities always
improves welfare. There is thus a fundamental complementarity between tuition
and selection of students. It should be noted that we do not argue for the
introduction of tuitions which in the absence of student grants can have severe
eciency and redistributive eects. We rather argue that allowing universities
to select students according to their preferences can make things worse compared
to a system in which students are more or less randomly allocated to universities.
Economists have only recently begun to analyze the implications of reforms
in the University system. Consequently, it seems that we are the rst looking at
the right-to-select phenomenon. The paper that is closest to ours in terms of the
setting (it also regards a matching market in education) is Besley and Ghatak.1
But they investigate the eects of incentive pay for teachers on a market in
which schools match with motivated teachers, while our paper asks to what
extent a partial reform, the right of student selection, is welfare enhancing in
terms of the matching between universities and students, and in terms of the
incentives for universities to adjust to changing demands.
2 The model
2.1 The market for education
There are h potential students and g universities. Students can be of type
s 2 fA;Bg with  being the proportion of type A; universities can be of type
u 2 fa;bg with 
0 being the proportion of type a. The notation is chosen to
make clear that there are complementarities between universities and students
as explained below, but also a;A and b;B re
ect the idea that there is vertical
dierentiation both in terms of universities and students, with a more productive
than b, and A more productive than B.
In the economy we look at, there are more individuals seeking university
education than places that can be lled by students. Consequently, universities
have bargaining power. Formally, we suppose that
h > 
0g;
(1   )h > (1   
0)g
h < g
1Besley, Timothy and Maitresh Ghatak (2006), "Sorting with Motivated Agents: Impli-
cations for School Competition and Teacher Incentives", Journal of the European Economic
Association, vol 4, 2/3, pp 404-14
3so that not all individuals can attend university (h > g), there are less uni-
versities of type a than individuals of type A, less universities of type b than
individuals of type B and there are less type-A students than universities.
Initially, type-a universities are of high productivity and type-b are of low
productivity. However, the low-productivity (b) universities can make an eort
to update the human capital of their professors, improve their administration
etc. Provided they spend a costly eort e, b universities can become highly pro-
ductive. e is the probability of success of reform or of restructuring the university
and it implies a cost v(e) to universities. The productivity of b universities thus
becomes stochastic, with probability e, it becomes high (the university trans-
forms itself to an a type), while with probability 1   e, they remain b types.
Those b universities that successfully transform will be called \lucky", while
those who fail to reform are called \unlucky".
Depending on the e chosen in equilibrium, the number of high productivity
universities diers from the initial proportion of a universities, 




0 + e(1   
0):





0)g (b e is the eort level needed to have the same number of high
productive universities and of type A students.). Evidently, when e = 0 in
equilibrium, all b universities remain b universities.
We will call type-a and \lucky" type-b universities productive universities
and type-b \unlucky" universities unproductive universities. A priori we may
have matches between any type of student and a productive or an unproductive
universities. A student of type s 2 fA;Bg that is matched with a productive




; similarly it will be denoted by s 2
fA;Bg if the match is with an unproductive university.
The assumptions about the composition of universities (a and b) and in-
dividuals (A and B) together with the Inada condition could be changed and
would yield dierent equilibria, but we believe this combination of assumptions
to be both realistic and to yield interesting implications. In particular, the
assumptions guarantee that there will always be some type-B individuals at-
tending universities, and that there is always the possibility of any given type of
students attending high or low productivity universities or with out place in a
university. Any other set of assumptions we could think of would rule out some
of these possibilities.
2.2 Wages
On the labor market, wages can take four dierent values, wi 2 f!;w1;w2;w3g;
with w3 > w2 > w1 > !. We assume that wages already include the opportu-
nity cost of attending a university (in other words that the opportunity cost of
attending a university does not osets its benets). As students and universi-
ties dier in their productivity, wages dier depending on the student-university
match according to the following assumptions:
41. an A student that attends a productive university gets a wage w3, a B
student that attends productive unviersity gets a wage w2,
2. an A student that attends an unproductive university gets a wage w2, a
B student that attends an unproductive university gets a wage w1.
3. an individual who not attend university gets a wage ! regardless of his
type.





Note that from the perspective of universities the wage of its graduates will
be stochastic. If the university is of type b type A (B) students will have wages
w3 (w2) or w2 (w1) with probabilities e or 1   e. We assume that there are
complementarities between the high types of students and universities. Thus,
the following condition holds:
w3   w2 > w2   w1 (1)
These assumptions mean three things: (i) students attending a universities
have higher expected wages than students attending b universities; (ii) the innate
ability of students is more important than the quality of the university; (iii) the
ability of students aects the productivity eects of teachers' eorts.
In principle, one could take other assumptions about the composition of
universities (type a and b) and students (type A and B) which would yield
dierent equilibria. We believe this combination of assumptions to be both
realistic and to yield interesting implications. In particular, the assumptions
guarantee that there will always be some type B students attending universities,
and that there is always the possibility of any given type of students attending
high or low productivity universities or with out place in a university. Any other
set of assumptions we could think of would rule out some of these possibilities.
To simplify notation we normalize ! to be equal to zero.
2.3 Payos
We denote with an upper bar those variables related to a high-productivity uni-
versity and with a lower bar those related to a low-productivity university; this
means that upper bar variables correspond to type-a or lucky type-b universities
and lower bar variables correspond to unlucky type-b universities.
Student utility is purely monetary. The utility of an individual of type s and
that gets a wage wi is
wi   ts
5where ts is the fee he has to pay to attend a university of type s. Let ts 2
fts;tsg; ts is the tuition fee a student of type s would pay to a high productivity
university, and ts is the tuition fee it pays to a low productivity university.
Universities care about the type of students who attend. High-productivity
universities prefer students of type A, and low-productivity universities prefer
students of type B. The idea behind this assumption is that most professors like
to teach people who are similar to themselves. For instance, it is much nicer to
teach mathematics to people who like mathematics. We thus assume that there
are costs associated with students who do not match the professors' preferences
and skills. When a student of type A (B) attends a university a (b) this cost
is zero, while the cost associated with a student of the non-matching type is c.
Universities also care for the monetary payments they receive so their ex post
payo is given by ts   v(e) or ts   c   v(e), depending on the type of student
they attend.
Note that there is a divergence between the preference ordering (for a given
tuition fee) of students and universities for their counterparts in the market.
While all students (of type A or B) prefer to attend a-type universities, high
(low) productivity universities prefer A (B) students. We denote by V the payo
of a high productivity university and by V the payo of a low productivity
university.
2.4 Timing and structure of analysis
We study a sequential equilibrium. Universities rst chose their eort and then
the admission process takes place. The solution is by backwards induction.
Clearly, the eort level exerted by a type-b university will depend on the expec-
tation about equilibrium matching in the second period. Since the uncertainty
is resolved before individuals choose university, it will only aect universities.
Universities will look at the expected value of making the eort given the best
response of the other guys
We will study the sorting and eort choice that emerge under three dierent
environments: (i) an unregulated market equilibrium; (ii) a situation in which
there are no tuition fees, but universities are allowed to select students, (iii) one
in which there are no tuition fees and no selection of students by universities.
3 Equilibrium
The Inada condition on v(e) allows us to keep the analysis to the case where

(e)g < h so that high-productivity universities are always on the short side of
the market and have all the bargaining power. A priori there are four types of
equilibria in the second stage of the game (given e). They are are characterized
by the type of student-universities match. The four types of equilibria are shown
in Figure 3.
In the rst type of equilibrium (i), all type-A get a place in a university, and
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g   (1   )h A matches
h   g uneducated

g B matches










(h   g) uneducated

 (1   )g B matches
(1   
)(1   )g B
matches
(h   g)(1   )
undeducated
Figure 1: Types of equilibria
7of A matches, a number h   
(e)g of A matches and a number g   h of B
matches; there are also h   g type-B individuals that do not attend university.
In the second type (ii), there are type-A and B that do not get a place in a
university; all type-A who get a place in a university attend a high-productivity
university and all type-B individuals who get a place in a university attend a
low-productivity university. There is a number 
(e)g of A matches, a number
[1   
(e)]g of B matches. There are h   
(e)g type-A individuals without
a place in a university and (1   )h   (1   )g type-B individuals without
university.
In the third type (iii), all type-B individuals get a place in a university, and
all individuals who do not get a place are of type A. There is a number 
(e)g of
B matches, a number (1   )h 
(e)g of B matches and a number g (1   )h
of A matches. There are h g type-A individuals that do not attend university.
Finally, there is a fourth type (iv) in which individuals are randomly matched
to universities. There is a number 
(e)g of A matches, a number 
(e)(1   )g
of B matches, a number [1   
(e)]g of A matches and a number [1   
(e)](1   )g
of B matches. There are also (h   g) type-A individuals without a place in a
university, and (h   g)(1   ) type-B individuals without a place in a university.
3.1 Benchmark: equilibria in the free market
We are interested in comparing the case with autonomy over selection of students
vs no selection autonomy, both under the same assumption that no fees can be
levied. We here begin the analysis by investigating a setting in which a free
market governs the education system. More specically, students pay fees, ts
and ts; note that we allow tuition fees to depend on the type (A or B) of student
and on whether the university is productive or not. We also assume that when
there is shortage of places and several individuals of the same type demand the
available places, these places will be assigned randomly.
We now show that in the free market only type-i and type-ii equilibria may
take place. Type-iii equilibria can be ruled out since the willingness to pay
for attending a university of type-A students will always be higher of type-B
students, and random matching as in type-iv will not occur.
The reservation utility of not attending university implies that the maximum
tuition fees are given by (recall we normalized ! = 0)
tA  w3; tA  w2; tB  w2 and tB  w1: (2)
As universities have all the bargaining power (they are on the short side of the
market), these tuition fee levels will obtain in equilibrium.
In type-i equilibrium it must be that
tA   c  tB; (3)
tA  tB   c:
so that low productivity universities prefer type-A students but are willing to
take-B type students.
8In type-ii equilibrium it must be that
tB  tA   c;
tA  tB   c:
so that high productivity universities prefer type-A students and are not willing
to take type-B students.
For type-i equilibrium to take place it must be that
w2   w1  c;
w3 + c  tB:
The second condition is satised since from (2) w2  tB.
Accordingly, there exists a c such that if c  (<)c type-ii(i) equilibria obtains.
This threshold level of c is given by
c = w2   w1:
For further reference it is important to notice that, as long as there are no
external restrictions on tuition fees, selection of students by universities is a
redundant instrument.
We now turn to eort in type-i equilibrium. The expected payos of a high
and low productivity universities are, respectively
V = tA








(e) is the probability of having a student of type-A for a low productivity uni-
versity. These expressions follow from the fact that in type-i equilibrium a high
productivity university gets type-A students with probability one, while low-
productivity universities get type-A students with a less than one probability.
The utility of a type-a university is
Va = V
while that of a type-b university is
Vb(e) = eV + (1   e)V (e)   v(e):
The FOC for e is 
V   V (e)






















Using the equilibrium payos obtained above and rearranging we can write the
FOC for e as
w3   w1   [   (1   e)0(e)](w2   w1   c) = v0(e): (5)
Further, in the appendix we show that [   (1   e)0(e)] = 1 so the FOC is
w3   w2 + c = v0 (emi): (6)





eV + (1   e)V   v(e)
and, consequently their will be given by
tA   tB = v0(e)
or, using the equilibrium values of tuition fees
w3   w1 = v0(emii) (7)
To show that only type-i and type-ii equilibrium may take place, note that
in type-iii equilibrium it must be that
w2   tB  w1   tB
w1   tB  !
w2   tA  w3   tA
w2   tA  !:
There exist fee values such that all of these equations are satised; take for
example tA = w3, tA = w2, tB = w2 and tB = w1. Since universities have all
the bargaining power these will be the equilibrium values of tuition fees. Since
there are no type-A students attending high productivity universities tA will
not be observed in this type of equilibria; any value for tA which is greater or
equal than w3 will be consistent with this type of equilibrium. Incidentally note
that the equilibrium values of tuition fees in type-i and type-iii are the same,
so a priori for fee levels tA = w3;tA = w2;tB = w2 and tA = w1 one cannot
know which type of equilibrium will result. The problem can be easily solved
since in each case there is one tuition fee level that is not observed and can be
10set freely by universities; thus if, universities set tA = w3, tA = w2, tB = w2 +"
and tB = w1 the equilibrium allocation will be that of type-i. To get type-iii
equilibrium it suces if tA = w3 + ", tA = w2, tB = w2 and tB = w1.
In type-iii equilibrium, prots of high-productivity universities are
tB   c = w2   c
and of low-productivity universities are
[1   e (e)]tB + e (e)(tA   c) = pBw1 + pA (w2   c):
where e (e) is the probability for a given low productivity university of having
a student of type A.
In type-i equilibrium prots of high productivity universities are
w3
and those of low productivity universities are
(e)(w2   c) + [1   (e)]w1:
Clearly prots of high productivity university are higher in type-i than in
type-iii equilibrium. If in equilibrium of type-iii, high-productivity universities
want to achieve higher prots they can do so by deviating from tA = w3 + ",
tB = w2 to tA = w3 ;tB = w2 + ".
A nal remark concerns eort as a function of c. We know that when c
increases, we go from a type-i equilibrium to a type-ii equilibrium. In type-i
equilibrium eort increases with c2; in type-ii equilibrium eort does not change
with c (see 7). Since the FOC for eort in type-i equilibrium converges to that of
type-ii equilibrium we have that eort weakly increases with c; i.e., it increases
up to c; and then is constant.
3.2 No tuition fees but selection of students by teachers
Suppose now that no (substantial) tuition fees can be levied, but universities
can decide whether they accept a particular student. First notice, that it can
be readily shown that all potential students will want to attend a university, all
prefer highly productive universities, but only those of type A will get a place
in universities of type a; while low productivity universities will only accept
students of type B. Equilibrium sorting is thus as in the type-ii equilibrium
discussed above. There will be 
(e)g A matches, [1   
(e)]g B matches. Addi-
tionally, h   
(e)g type-A and (1   )h   [1   










V = V = 0
and
Va = Vb = 0
The most important result of course is also very easy to show: eort will be
nil, no university has an incentive to update their human capital, because this
involves a cost of eort without reaping any gain, given that no pay for tuition
can be asked from the student.
3.3 No tuition fees and no selection
In this setting, we have random assignment of students to universities, because
regardless of their type, all students prefer a universities to b universities. The
equilibrium assignment is thus as in the type-iv equilibrium discussed above.
Consequently the expected payos of high productivity and low productivity
universities are, respectively
V =  (1   )c
V =  c
The payos of a university of type a and of a university of type b are,
respectively
Va = V
Vb = eV + (1   e)V   v(e)




= V   V   v0(ens)  0
= (2   1)c   v0(ens)  0





Otherwise eort will be equal to zero. Moreover eort is non-decreasing in c.
Note that in the case in which  > 1
2 eort will be higher when universities are
not allowed to charge for tuition than when they are allowed.
4 Welfare comparisons
4.1 First best
The allocation of students to universities in the rst-best depends on the size
of c. Clearly it is optimal to ll places in high productivity universities with A
12students. Whether we have places in low productivity universities lled with
A or B students depends on whether c is higher or smaller than w2   w1. If
c < w2  w1the rst-best allocation is type-i equilibrium. If c > w2  w1 having
type-A students in a low productivity university is too costly, and the rst-best
allocation is type-ii equilibrium. Notice that rst-best eort is in line with the
outcome in the free market equilibrium.
Utilitarian welfare is given by
W = h
h





0Va + (1   
0)Vb
i
In the free market, since universities are on the short side of the market and
have all the bargaining power students have zero net utility (UA = UB = ! = 0)





0V + (1   
0)

eV + (1   e)V (e)   v(e)
o




0w3 + (1   
0)
h
emiw3 + (1   e)(emi)(w2   c)

























0w3 + (1   





(emii)w3 + (1   
0)(1   emii)w1   (1   
0)v(emii)
o
In the selection, no-tuition fee equilibrium welfare is given by the sum of
utilities of individuals, which is tantamount to the expected wages. Universities
receive no tuition fees, make zero eort and do not receive students of the type
which is costly to receive (Va = Vb = 0):
Ws = 
0gw3 + (1   
0)gw1
13In the no-selection, no-tuition fee equilibrium welfare takes into account
the utility of the universities who incur eort costs and may be matched with




(ens)[w3 + (1   )(w2   c)]
+[1   
(ens)][ (w2   c) + (1   )w1]   (1   
0)v(ens)
o
4.2 Comparison of welfare: selection vs no selection
First, suppose  < 1
2 so that eort of type b universities is zero. In that case

(0) = 













w3 + (1   )(w2   c)
i
+(1   
0)[ (w2   c) + (1   )w1]
o
:
We can then write a condition under which student selection by universities




0 (1   )w3 + (1   
0)w1 > [
0 (1   ) + (1   
0)](w2   c):
Evidently whether or not welfare is higher under selection of students de-
pends on the parameters. To see this note that by assumption w3 > w2   c,
so that (1   )w3 > (1   )(w2   c). In this case, if c > w2   w1, then
Ws > W ns(0). Hence, c < w2   w1 is a necessary condition for Ws < W ns(0).
Writing the welfare dierence between selection and no selection as below leads
to the rst proposition:
Ws   Wns(0) = 
0 (1   )(w3   w2)
 (1   
0) (w2   w1) + [
0 (1   )   (1   
0)]c:
Proposition 1 When  < 1
2, i.e., the majority of students is of type B, the
welfare is always higher under selection when c > w2   w1. If c < w2   w1,
welfare is more likely to be higher under selection than under no selection the
bigger are w3   w2 or c; and the smaller are w2   w1 or .
The Proposition re
ects a simple tradeo. When the majority of students is
of type B, universities do not make adjustment eorts. Under selection, there
are type-A students that do not get a university education. Taking these A
students into a b university would create unit costs c for the b university but
increase wages by w2   w1. So, if c > w2   w1, welfare is maximized under
selection, while otherwise it depends on the parameters.
In the case of  > 1
2, welfare comparison becomes more involved, because it
also depends on e.
14Proposition 2 When  > 1
2;i.e., the majority of students is of type A so that
welfare also depends on e.
Now whether selection is welfare enhancing or not depends on the compari-
son of
Ws = g f
0w3 + (1   
0)w1g
Wns(ens) = g f
(ens)[w3 + (1   )(w2   c)]
+[1   
(ens)][ (w2   c) + (1   )w1]g   v(ens):
with ens > 0. Since Wns is increasing in e not allowing universities to select
their own students will other thinsg equal increase the welfare of society. Put
dierently, when there are many A, i.e., talented students, it is more likely that
no selection is better, provided that there are no tuition fees.
Suppose now that the government decides on whether to allow selection or
not only taking into account net monetary benets of education. In particular
the government disregards the eort costs of adjustment of universities. In this
case the government compares
f Ws = g f
0w3 + (1   
0)w1g
f Wns(ens) = g f
(ens)[w3 + (1   )(w2   c)]
+[1   
(ens)][ (w2   c) + (1   )w1]g:
In the case in which  < 1
2 the same comparison as above is valid. In the case
in which  > 1
2 the main dierence is that f Wns > W ns. Consequently the
government will have a stronger tendency towards not allowing selection than
when full welfare is taken into account.
4.3 Concluding remarks
We have suggested a simple model which shows that partial reforms of the uni-
versity system may decrease welfare. We are not arguing that tuitions should be
introduced, because they involve the risk of excluding certain groups of students
from education. However, in the absence of tuition fees, allowing universities
to select their students may distort the incentives to modernize universities, in
terms of updating human capital of professors or of creating more professional
management structures. It thus seems that the policy alternative is between
keeping the old bureaucratic system or a market-based system in which there
are tuitions and the right of universities to select students. This tradeo can
be made more favorable for the market solution when accompanies by means-
tested subsidies. This paper is not dwelling on these important issues, but rather
points to the pitfalls of partial reforms.
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Consequently, (e)   (1   e)0(e) = 1:
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